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Kelo et al. v. City of New London - Takings Law
This Land Is Your Land?
By Ronald S. Cope'
Few cases have generated such incredible
debate and news media coverage as the recent opinion in Kelo v. City ofNew London, CT.2 This five
to four decision of the United States Supreme Court
digs deep into the heart of constitutional law and reflects the very subtle balance of power on the Court.
The specific issue presented for review was whether a
city's decision to take property for the purpose of economic development satisfies the "public use" requirement of the Fifth
Amendment. For private
property owners, this case
raises the fear that government may arbitrarily take
their land for the benefit of
some third party under the
guise ofa nebulous plan for
'economic development."
From a municipality's
perspective, there is a need
to revitalize economically

distressed areas, to cre-

the City a "distressed municipality." 3 In 1998, the City's
unemployment rate was double that of the state average and its population ofjust under 24,000 was at its
lowest since 1920*4 In order to alleviate these conditions, the New London Development Corporation
("NLDC"), a private non-profit entity, which had been
established some years earlier to assist the City in planning economic development, was reactivated.' In January of 1998, the state authorized $15.35 million dollars in bonds to support the
NLDC's planning activities and
towards the creation of a Fort
Trumbull State Park.6 The
pharmaceutical company,
Pfizer, Inc., announced that it
would build a $300 million research facility on a site imme-

diately adjacent to Fort
Trumbull.' After receiving approval from the City Council,

the NLDC engaged in planning
activities including a series of
neighborhood meetings to

educate the public about the
planning process.' Upon obtaining state level approval, the
NLDC finalized an integrated
development plan that focused
on 90 acres of the Fort
terests of private property
Trumbull area.9 The plan was
as protected by the Constitution with the ever
designed to capitalize on the
Kelo may make it easier f(or local governments
expanding needs of comto storm you r castle.
arrival of the Pfizer facility and
the new commerce it was exmunities torelieve economic
pected
to
attract,
as well as to make the City more
stagnation and, in many areas, high unemployment.
attractive and to create leisure and recreational opportunities on the waterfront and in the parks.10 The
Basic facts
City Council approved the plan in January 2000 and
The City of New London ("the City") is lo- authorized the NLDC to purchase property or to acate jobs and to increase
tax revenues. The Court,
in reaching its decision,
walks a delicate line which
attempts to balance the in-

cated in southeastern Connecticut. Decades of economic decline led a state agency in 1990 to designate
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(Kelo, continued from page 14)
quire property by exercising eminent domain in the
City's name."' The NLDC successfully negotiated the
purchase of most of the real estate in the 90 acre area,
but its negotiations with Mrs. Kelo and the other Petitioners failed. Consequently, the NLDC initiated condemnation proceedings in November 2000.12
One Petitioner, Suzette Kelo, had lived in the
Fort Trumbull area since 1997.13 She had not only
made extensive improvements to her house, she prized
her home for its water view. 14 Another Petitioner,
Wilhelmina Dery, was bom in her Fort Trumbull house
in 1918 and had lived there her entire life. Her husband Charles (also a Petitioner) had lived in the house
since they married some 60 years ago. There was no
allegation that any of the properties to be taken was
blighted or otherwise in poor condition; rather, they
were condemned only because they happen to be located in the development area.'5 In December 2000,
the Petitioners brought action in the New London Superior Court.' 6 They claimed, among other things,
that the taking of their properties would violate the
"public use" restriction of the Fifth Amendment. 7
After a seven-day bench trial, the Superior
Court granted mixed relief, enjoining the taking
as to certain properties and allowing it to move
forward as to other properties. Both sides took
appeals to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.'I That
court held that all of the City's proposed takings were
valid. 19 It upheld the lower court's determination that
the takings were authorized by Chapter 132, the state's
Municipal Development Statute.20 That statute expresses a legislative determination that the taking of
land, even developed land, as part of an economic
development project is a "public use" and in the "public interest." 21 The Connecticut Supreme Court, relying on cases such as Hawaii HousingAuthority v.
23
Midkiff2 2 and Berman v. Parker,
held that such
economic development qualified as a valid public use
under both the federal and state constitutions. 24
The Majority Decision-Replacing "Public Use"
with "Public Purpose"
In order to reach its ultimate determination,
the Supreme Court reviewed cases decided towards
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http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol10/iss3/10

the end of the 1 9 ' Century. Those cases rescinded
the earlier "use by the public" test as difficult to administer and, instead, "embraced the broader interpretation of public use as 'public purpose."' 2 5 The
view, that "public use" as set forth in the Fifth Amendment has been replaced by "public purpose," is central to the Court's decision.
There are three identifiable categories of takings that comply with the "public use" requirement.
First, the sovereign may transfer private property to
public ownership. 26 This may be the taking of private
property for the construction of a road or a municipally owned hospital. Second, the sovereign may transfer private property to private parties, who in turn make
the property available for public use. 27 This may be
the case with common carriers such as a railroad. Such
may also be the case with a stadium open to the general public, but where its construction is financed in
part by public funds.
The third category is the more controversial
and involves, in certain limited circumstances and to
meet certain exigencies, the taking of property to serve
a "public purpose" such as the taking in Berman v.
Parke, which was part of an overall plan to eliminate
blight and generally unsafe housing conditions. 28 Even
though Mr. Berman's department store was not itself
blighted, the United States Supreme Court did not second guess Congress' decision to eliminate harm to the
public emanating from a blighted neighborhood by
treating the neighborhood as a whole rather than property by property. 29 Because such a taking "directly
achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the
property was turned over to a private use."3 0
In the Kelo case, however, the City did not
claim that any of the properties involved were a
source of any social harm. Indeed, Mrs. Kelo's property was a well-maintained home. Here, the taking of
private property is predicated upon a "prediction" that
a proposed new use would generate some secondary
benefit for the public, such as increased tax revenue,
more jobs and maybe even aesthetic pleasure. But,
as Justice O'Connor warns, "nearly any lawful use of
(Kelo, continued on page 16)
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(Kelo, continued from page 15)
real property can be said to generate some incidental
benefit to the public."3 1
However, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion does point out that if there truly is an elicit purpose
of simply taking property from A to give to B, a review of the facts would reveal this unlawful circumstance.3 2 While the test suggested by Justice Kennedy
is vague, the fact is that in Kelo there was a well thought
out plan which the municipality was seeking to implement. Indeed, it is clear that without this plan the United
States Supreme Court would not have upheld the taking. Justice Thomas's dissent explains that the majority is saying that a taking will be upheld so long as the
purpose is "legitimate" and the means "not irrational."3 3
The plan in Kelo, however, is not without its
faults, as it was predicated on the upgradingof properties for private and public benefit. The essential problem with this rationale is that there is always the possibility of "upgrading" property. For example, a Motel
6 might be upgraded by replacing it with a Ritz Carlton
and certainly any home could be "upgraded" by a
shopping mall.34 Justice O'Connor, in her dissent,
pointedly states:

Ultimately, while the court disposed of
Mrs. Kelo's arguments, it has not
alleviated many people's concerns as
the opinion simply establishes a vague
"federal baseline."

Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now
vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so
long as it might be upgraded - i.e.,

given to an owner who will use it in a
way that the legislature deems more

Ultimately, while the Court disposed of Mrs.
Kelo's arguments, it has not alleviated many people's
concerns as the opinion simply establishes a vague "federal baseline." The majority does state that "nothing in
our opinion precludes any State from placing further
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power."36
However, Justice O'Connor points out, that this is an
abdication of the United States Supreme Court's responsibility.3 7 It should be noted that the Michigan
Supreme Court in the case of County of Wayne v.
Hathcock,3 8 has specifically rejected the economic
takings concept, holding that under the Michigan Constitution no such taking was permitted.3 9
Contrary to the principles thought out by the
framers of our Constitution, the replacement of the
"public use" clause with a "public purpose" clause in
Kelo, as noted by Justice Thomas, ultimately allows
"the Court to hold, against all common sense, that a
costly urban renewal project whose stated purpose is
a vague promise of new jobs and increased tax revenue, but which is also suspiciously agreeable to the
Pfizer Corporation is for a 'public use.'"0
Illinois Takings Law
For practitioners in Illinois, it is important to
understand the case of Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, LLC 4 1when studying takings law.
The Southwestern Illinois Development Authority ("SWIDA"), was created in 1987 by the Illinois General Assembly4 2 to "promote industrial, commercial, residential, service, transportation and recreational activities and facilities, thereby reducing the evils
attendant upon unemployment and enhancing the public health, safety, morals, happiness and general welfare of this State."43 The court in SWIDA determined
whether it had properly exercised the power of eminent domain to take property owned by National City
Environmental, LLC ("NCE") and St. Louis Auto
Shredding Company ("St. Louis Auto") and to convey that property to Gateway International Motor
Sports Corporation ("Gateway")."

beneficial to the public - in the pro-

cess. 35
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(Kelo, continued from page 16)
In June of 1996, SWIDA issued $21.5 million dollars in taxable sports facility revenue bonds.4 5
The proceeds of the bonds were lent to Gateway to
finance the development of a multi-purpose automotive sports and training facility in the region.4 6 The
race track was developed and has flourished.4 7 In
1998, Gateway increased its seating capacity and desired to increase its parking capacity. 48 It asked
SWiIDA to use its quick take eminent domain powers
to acquire land to the west of the race track for the
purpose of expanding Gateway's parking facilities.49
The adjacent 148.5 acre tract of land was owned by
NCE (collectively with St. Louis Auto). SWIDA
proceeded to seek to acquire NCE's property and
made a written offer to purchase of $1 million dollars." After NCE twice declined the million dollar
offer, SWIDA instituted a condemnation action.52
At trial, testimony was introduced that "the
taking was for a public purpose as there were serious public safety issues involved."53 A witness from
the Illinois Department of Transportation testified that
the department was working with Gateway to develop
a traffic plan that would move traffic in and out of the
race track facility, while minimizing impact on the surrounding state and interstate highways.7 According
to this witness, a safety hazard was created because
drivers do not normally anticipate stopped traffic on
the interstate. The trial court granted the quick take
and determined the amount of compensation. 56 An appeal was taken to the Appellate Court which reversed
the lower court's decision and an appeal was subsequently taken to the Illinois Supreme Court.57
At first, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
the judgment of the Appellate Court. However, upon
the grant of a rehearing," the court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that the taking violated
both the Illinois Constitution (Article 1 § 15) and the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 5 9
The issue presented was "whether SWIDA exceeded
the boundaries of constitutional principles [not stating
which Constitution] and its authority by transferring
the property to a private party for a profit when the
property is not put to a public use."" The Court went
on to state:

It may be impossible to clearly delineate
the boundary between what constitutes a
legitimate public purpose and a private
benefit with no sufficient, legitimate public
purpose to support it. We deal, in other
words, with what traditionally has been
known as the police power. An attempt
to define its reach or trace its outer limits
is fruitless, for each case must turn on its
own facts.6 1
The Court further concluded that this taking
has all the trappings of simply taking property from A
in order give it to B with no valid public purpose intervening. 62 Although the Court "recognized that economic development is an important public purpose," 63
the Court gave some support to those who believe a
planned project would survive the Illinois Supreme
Court's scrutiny and held that:
While the activities here were undertaken in the guise of carrying out its
legislative mission, SWIDA's true intentions were not clothed in an independent legitimate government decision to further a planned public use.
SWIDA did not conduct or commission a thorough study of the parking
situation at Gateway. Nor did it formulate any economic plan requiring
additional parking at the race track.
SWIDA advertised that, for a fee, it
would condemn land at the request of
'private developers' for the 'private
use' of developers ... Clearly, the
foundation of this taking is rooted not
in the economic and planning process
with which SWIDA has been charged.
Rather, this action was undertaken
solely in response to Gateway's expansion goals and its failure to accomplish those goals through purchasing
NCE's land at an acceptable negotiated price. It appears SWIDA's true
intentions were to act as a default bro(Kelo, continued on page 18)
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protect that minority, in this case, private property
owners, from the will of the majority, as represented
here by the City Council of the City of New London.
There can be little doubt, however, that with the deciker of land for Gateway's proposed
parking plan.6"
sion in Berman v. Parkerand certainly the decision in
Midkiff, which directly transferred private property
The Illinois Supreme Court, based on the to other private individuals simply because it was
particular facts in SWIDA, saw an effort to take thought that "too much private property was in the
the property of one legitimate business and give it hands of a limited number of private individuals," that
to another simply because the race track sought to there has been a broad leap across a chasm of time
employ SWIDA to accomplish what it was not pre- between the framing of our Constitution and the social
pared to do, namely negotiate a fair price between revolution which has taken place during the 20" cencompeting businesses. The Court also saw that tury. Private property is subject to a whole slue of
Gateway had an alternative, which was to build a limitations and regulations, including taxation and
parking garage and thereby alleviate its parking zoning. The use to which property may be put
problem. Instead, it sought to employ SWIDA as may be severely limited and still not constitute a takits mercenary to accomplish what it could not do. ing.66
Viewed from this perspective, it might well
The court in Kelo wrestled mightily to find a
be argued that the Illinois Supreme Court simply way to remain within the boundaries of the Bill of Rights
decided the case based on its facts and that the with the protections afforded the individual and still
decision in Kelo, while taking a step beyond provide authority for the city to alleviate economic
Berman v. Parker could well describe the outer hardship. In a steady historical progression the proplimits of the law as it might be applied by the Illi- erty rights of the individual have given way to the felt
nois Supreme Court. The question still remains as to needs of society. In Kelo, there can be no doubt that
whether in Illinois economic development alone would another step has been taken, to extend the power of
be considered a valid public purpose under the Illinois the majority through the engine of economic planning.
Constitution. It certainly has a much better chance of Although the United States Supreme Court refused to
success in an area such as described in the Kelo case adopt a "bright line" rule that "economic development
where there is high unemployment, depressed prop- does not qualify as a public use," it is clear that witherty values and where the City has taken considerable out a showing of "community need" and a well thought
pains to formulate a plan for redevelopment.
out plan, it is likely that not only state courts, but even
the majority in Kelo, would not permit the taking.
Conclusions
(Kelo, continuedfrom page 17)

To protect property, the Fifth Amendment required that the "taking must be for public use" and
"just compensation" must be paid. While the issue
here is not "just compensation," it is important to remember that the Bill of Rights had, at least in terms of
the Fifth Amendment, the protection of minorities who
could not protect themselves in the political process
against the majority's will.65
In the 18" century it would have been unthinkable that private property would be taken to benefit
the common good as authorized in Kelo. The dissenters see the Fifth Amendment protections as those
basic to the rights of a minority. It was conceived to
Winter 2005
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I Ronald S. Cope is a partner in the Land and Resources
Practice Group of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP. He has
been involved in the creation of TIF Districts, the establishment of special assessments, special service areas, the creation of business districts, redevelopment areas and condemnation of land for public use. He has represented many
clients, both private and governmental, in land use matters
including the creation of Planned Unit Developments, annexations, drafting new zoning ordinances, and planning
and funding redevelopment projects and town centers.
2 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
3
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
4 Id.
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New Challenges Following Bankruptcy Reform
By Jeana Kim Reinbold'
Despite the concerns articulated by parties
representing both debtors and creditors, and many
impassioned debates in the United States Congress,I the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA")2 was finally
signed into law. Most of the provisions of the new
law took effect on October 17, 2005, representing
the most significant overhaul of the bankruptcy laws in
the United States more than a quarter of a century.
The enactment of the new legislation now presents significant challenges to bankruptcy practice.

Background and Concerns with BAPCPA
In her testimony before Congress, Professor
Elizabeth Warren, a leading opponent of BAPCPA
for many years, highlighted the many changes that had
occurred on the American economic scene since the
proposed bankruptcy reform had first been drafted
eight years ago. These changes included the emergence of some of the largest corporate bankruptcy
cases in American history, a list not exclusive to companies untainted by corporate scandal, which included
once-vaunted names such as Enron, Worldcom and
Adelphia.
Warren urged Congress to consider problems
not addressed by the bill when it was first written, such
as growing corporate abuses with executive compensation at the cost of benefits to ordinary employees,
scandals in the non-profit credit counseling industry
and the unchecked growth of payday loans, sub-prime
mortgage lending and the billion-dollar credit card industries. In addition, she decried the growing problems resulting from the extension of debt to less creditworthy customers with inadequate disclosure of the
pernicious grip of fees, penalties and interest on such
debt. Also, she pointed to recent studies that suggested that the majority of persons turning to bankruptcy relief only did so as a last resort, often in the
aftermath of financial problems brought about by serious medical problems, job loss or divorce.4

Law Reporter
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New laws have made hnkruptcy costlier and more
complex.

A wide range of public interest groups similarly opposed the bankruptcy reform.' Many bankruptcy judges and academics expressed concerns
with the workability of the proposed changes, and
questioned the wisdom of reducing incentives to
the Chapter 13 system6 and limiting many of the
benefits that existed under the old system. Academics questioned the efficacy of adopting a
"means test" that is "unnecessary, over-inclusive, painfully inflexible and costly," and denounced the adoption of a bill that failed to effectively target the "abuse"
it purportedly set out to end.' Groups representing
attorneys and many state bars expressed grave concern over the harsh new liability standards against bankruptcy attorneys incorporated in the new bill.' Consumer groups sounded the alarm in reference to the
increased costs and filing burdens upon honest but unfortunate debtors, and the reduction of debtor benefits in bankruptcy while creditor remedies were yet
to be expanded.9

The bill's supporters, however, held the view
that most Americans who live up to their financial re-

sponsibilities pay for those who do not.10 Supporters
also argued that reform was necessary to address the

I (Bankruptcy, continued on page 20)Winter 2005
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"abuse" that had become rampant in the bankruptcy
system. They argued that abuse could best be targeted by the implementation of a "means test," a provision designed to favor more "high-income" filers with
a perceived ability to repay at least some of their debt
into Chapter 13 as opposed to Chapter 7. Indeed,
congressional supporters believed that the "means test"
was the only key change in the bill" and the data they
relied on indicated that only a very small percentage
of filers would be affected by the means test. 12
Underlying the entire debate were, of course,
differing economic opinions. While critics of the bill
maintained that Americans should live up to their financial responsibilities to the extent they are able, and
repay what they are able to repay, the economic view
asserted that there were significant financial losses to
businesses and creditors that could not be ignored.
Critics of the economic view state, however, that the
argument that responsible consumers pay for those
who are not rests on faulty assumptions.' 3 Indeed,
their findings suggest that the events that lead to financial defaults occur regardless of bankruptcy.14 Following the passage of the new bankruptcy bill, there
continue to be unsettled questions regarding claims of
irresponsible lending by certain creditors as a major
factor in bankruptcy filings," and the effect the legislation will have on individuals, small businesses and
future economic growth.1 6
Addressing Concerns Post-BAPCPA
BAPCPA's new means test also ushers in increased
paperwork burdens on every person seeking relief
under the bankruptcy system. 17 Consumers now filing under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 will have to demonstrate whether they "pass" or "fail" the means test,
substantially document their financial condition and
complete credit counseling in order to even become
eligible to file the case. Even after the case is filed,
debtors will face reduced benefits and increased vulnerability to creditor and trustee actions.
Many of the enhanced requirements for filing a
case under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 are likely to prove
an onerous burden for individuals attempting to get a
case properly filed in the first place. Formerly, a proWinter 2005
Published by LAW eCommons, 2005

spective client could usually just come to a bankruptcy
attorney with one or two recent paycheck stubs and a
list of bills or pending liabilities, and advise the attorney as to monthly expenses and assets owned to obtain an evaluation of their financial situation. However, post-BAPCPA, even setting aside the new requirement that an attorney conduct a "reasonable investigation" into a prospective client's affairs subject
to possible sanctions,'I very specific documentation
will be required in order to complete the analysis as to
whether a person qualifies for Chapter 7 or Chapter
13. As a result, even before the client arrives at the
attorney's office, a client will want to gather at least six
(6) months of paycheck stubs, evidence of other income and living expenses and bank statements to enable the attorney to begin the analysis under the means
test and initial determination as to whether a bankruptcy might be in the person's best interest.
Additionally, the client will need to provide a
complete list of bills and potential liabilities, including
copies of all creditor notices, billing statements received
within the past three (3) months, copies of loan documents for real estate, vehicles and purchase money
goods, a list of all significant property owned and copies of all insurance policies. Any tax or government
debt, or child support owed or paid, also must be
specified, as these are liabilities entitled to special treatment under bankruptcy law. This treatment was expanded to benefit these entities under the new law.19
A recent credit report, property tax bill if applicable
and current tax returns are also items likely to be helpful with verifying assets, liabilities, and income. These
items will be required in order for an attorney to advise clients of their rights and liabilities properly were
they to file bankruptcy. For instance, debtors in bankruptcy must provide enhanced notice to creditors, as
specified in the new code, in order for the bankruptcy
stay to apply to those creditors.2 0 As other examples,
vehicles purchased within 910 days of the case will
be subject to a provision limiting the extent to which a
Chapter 13 debtor can modify the amount owed, 2
and homestead property purchased within 1215 days
may require that different exemptions apply in a case.2 2
As a result, a client who is unable to provide this kind
of information about his financial situation will be dis'

(Bankruptcy, continuedfrom page 19)
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The costs of bankruptcy will increase,
if from nothing else, based on the sheer
increase in paperwork that will be
required under BAPCPA.
advantaged from the start as he will be unable to receive proper advice from an attorney.
Assuming, however, that a person considering filing bankruptcy has determined that a bankruptcy
case would be in his best interest, the person will then
need to complete credit counseling in the 180-day
period before starting the case. To even be eligible to
file a case, an individual is now required to have "received from an approved nonprofit budget and credit
counseling agency described in section 111(a) an individual or group briefing (including a briefing conducted
by telephone or on the Internet) that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted
such individual in performing a related budget analysis." 23 Section 111 outlines the extensive new duties

of the bankruptcy clerk and U.S. Trustee in administering and regulating such "nonprofit budget and credit
counseling" programs. 24
There are very limited exceptions to the credit
counseling requirement. In attempting to claim an exception, the debtor must successfully present a declaration, claiming the debtor's exigent circumstances,
and stating that the debtor requested credit counseling
but was unable to obtain the services for five days.
This declaration must satisdfy the court. Alternatively,
persons who are impaired mentally or physically, rendering them unable to be able to complete the credit
counseling, might be exempt from this requirement.
Debtors who file their cases without completing credit
counseling or proving their exception risk having their
cases dismissed. Though BAPCPA is a still a new
law, several bankruptcy cases already have been dismissed by bankruptcy judges due to the failure of the
debtor to complete credit counseling prior to the filing
of the case.2 6
Chapter 7 and 13 cases are often filed under
emergency situations, such as to prevent the foreclo-
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sure of a home, a repossession of a car, the shut-off of
necessary utilities, the seizure of wages and other assets and the commencement or continuation of judicial processes. As a result, the threshold credit counseling requirement may most directly impact these
cases, where this requirement curtails the ability of
some of the individuals facing urgent situations to get
relief under Chapter 7 or 13 before additional costs
have accrued or before it is too late to stop the threatening proceeding.
Low-income clients, in particular, may be
more prone to waiting too long to address a serious situation due to lack of understanding or means
and thus will be adversely affected by this provision. Attorneys will need to work efficiently and
creatively to help their clients receive meaningful credit
counseling, while still effectively assisting their timestressed clients in getting relief in a bankruptcy case if
appropriate.
After the completion of the credit counseling, a person seeking to start her case will face
further documentation hurdles. The list of items
required both initially and over the course of the
bankruptcy proceeding has been expanded
significantly under BAPCPA. First, every Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 debtor must now also complete the
appropriate version of Form B22, "Statement of Current Monthly Income and Means Test Calculation,"
which will detail the means test analysis. 27 The burden
of completing these forms will depend on the complexity of the case. For instance, a debtor filing Chapter 7 who has a median income below the state median for his household will typically only have to complete the first 15 of the 56 questions, in addition to the
verification in question 56. On the other hand, the
Chapter 7 debtor who will need to prove special circumstances to bring him below the allowed median
amount will likely have to complete all 56 questions.
These forms, in addition to other new and revised official forms, can be found at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/interim.html.
In addition to the petition, the debtor must now
file: (i) a certified statement by the attorney or debtor
that the notice required under the amended Section
342(b) of the Code was received by the debtor; (ii)
(Bankruptcy, continuedon page 28)
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The Central American Free Trade
Agreement: Free Trade or Do
Women Pay the Price?
By Andrea Hunwick
in San Jose, Losta Rica, many people do not Know whlat
to expect from CAFA.

The Central American Free Trade Agreement
("CAFTA"), a proposal for free-trade between the
United States and five Central American countries
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic was signed
by President George Bush on August 2, 2005, and

will go into effect in January of 2006.' Since 2002,
President Bush has aggressively promoted this
comprehensive agreement while Congress approved
"fast track" provisions to speed up negotiations.
Likewise, many groups have aggressively opposed the
treaty, including many who view it as a detriment to
the already fragile rights of women in Central America.
CAFTA is modeled after NAFTA, and
focuses in large part on the import and export of
agricultural and textile goods and business. Bush
considers CAFTA a vital piece in his plan for global
trade, and for several years he has been promoting
the reciprocal benefits he expects both sides will
realize under CAFTA. In May of 2005, Bush said
in support of CAFTA:

CAFTA brings benefits to all sides.
For the
newly
emerging
democracies of Central America,
CAFTA would bring new
investment that means good jobs
and higher labor standards for their
Central American
workers.
consumers would have better
access to more U.S. goods at better
prices. And by passing this
agreement, we would signal that the
world's leading trading nation was
committed to a closer partnership
with countries in our own backyard,
countries which share our values. 4

The biggest domestic proponents of CAFTA
consist of more than 80 crop and livestock groups
including the National Corn Growers Association
("NCGA"), the American Soybean Association
("ASA"), and the National Cotton Council ("NCC").
NCGApresident Leon Corzine believes that CAFTA
is beneficial for U.S. agriculture because U.S.
agricultural products currently face high tariffs in
Central America and the Dominican Republic, and
CAFTA would make more than 80 percent of U.S.
exports duty free immediately.' After CAFTA,
Corzine states that these products will become duty
free, thus, increasing U.S. agricultural profits by an
estimated 1.5 billion dollars annually.6
Furthermore, Commerce Secretary
Carlos Gutierrez and U.S. Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick have been advocating the ratification
of CAFTA to businesses. Gutierrez believes that it
exemplifies "free and fair trade," which "lifts
people out of poverty, creates jobs, and creates

growth."' He describes CAFTA as a "win/win"
for everyone involved, an agreement that will
promote freedom and democracy.' Similarly,

Zoellick believes CAFTA will improve business
in both Central America and the United States.
"[CAFTA] will solidify and create new
opportunities to sell to the largest market in the
world," he said.9
Opponents to CAFTA, however, believe
that either Central America or the United States
may be on the losing end of a flawed bargain.
Some claim CAFTA poses a threat to the U.S. sugar
industry and will have an overall negative impact
on U.S. jobs. 0 Additionally, others are concerned

about the negative effects that CAFTA will have
on impoverished Central American nations.

(CAFTA, continued on page 23)
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